4th Transylvanian Political Science Conference Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj/Kolozsvár/Klausenburg, 28-29 May 2015

Edgár Dobos:

Three nations, two kin-states, one international community?


The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina



Brubaker's triadic nexus: the case of BiH

- BiH: anomaly within Yugoslavia and the international system
- Titular nation & national minority?
 - 3 'constituent nations' (Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs) and 'others' (17 'national minorities')
- Kin-state?
 - B-Croats and B-Serbs: 2 'kin-states', a real and an imagined homeland
- Nationalizing state?
 - Nationalizing or ethnicizing and mixed sub-state units, shifting minority-majority position depending on scale and locality
 - Competing ethnopolitics based on different state- and nation-building visions
 - Bibó: existential fears; territorio-centric approach
- Triadic nexus?
 - Dual triadic nexus: BiH, B-Croats, Croatia; BiH, B-Serbs, Serbia (DPA: 'special relations')
 - Actors missing: actors of international intervention (OHR, EU, UN, foreign patrons, transnational religious organizations etc.); refugees and IDPs
- Complex local-international, inter- and intra-ethnic dynamics

B-Serbs: R. Karadžić ↔ pro-Bosnia Serbs; R. Karadžić ↔ S. Milošević; R. Karadžić ↔ ARK autonomists B-Croats: S. Kljuić ↔ M. Boban; M. Boban ↔ D. Paraga B-Muslims (Bosniaks):A. Izetbegović ↔ F.Abdić



Source: Götze 2013



Члан 12.

Ова одлука ступа на снагу даном доношења и објавиће се у "Службеном гласнику Републике Српске".

Bpoj 01-229/93. 17. септембра 1993. год. Др Радован Карапић, с.р.

Председник Републике.

386

На основу члана 115. Пословника Народне скупштине Републике Српске српског народа у Босии и Херцеговини ("Службени гласник српског народа у БиХ", број 3/92), на седници одржаној 12. маја 1992. године, Скупштина српског народа у Босни и Херцеговини, донела је

оплуку о стратешким циљевима српског народа у босни и херцеговини

Стратешки циљеви, односно приоритети српског народа у Босни и Херцеговини су:

1. Државно разграничење од друге две нацио-

налне заједнице.

2. Коридор између Семберије и Крајине.

3. Успостављање коридора у долини реке Дрине, односно елиминисање Дрине као границе између српских држава.

4. Успостављање границе на рекама Уни и Не-

ретви.

5. Подела града Сарајева на српски и муслимански деб и успостављање у сваком од делова ефективне дожавне власти.

6. Излаз Републике Српске на море.

Препселник **Epoi 02-130/92.** ... Народне скупштине,.. 12. маја 1992. године Мр Момчило Крајишник, с.р.

- преко 500.000 до 1.000.000 динара противвредност 4 ДМ.
- преко 1.000.000 до 2.000.000 дипара противвредност 7 ДМ.
- за сваких започетих 1.000 динара изнад 2.000.000 још 1% а највише противвредност 10 ДМ.

2. За тужбу у споровима издржавања плаћа се

такса у износу противвредности 1 ДМ.

3. За тужбу за утврвивање и оспоравање очинства плаћа се такса у износу противвредности 5 ДМ.

4. За тужбу којом се тражи развод брака, поништај брака, утврвивање постојања и непостојања брака и утврвивање да је брак закључен, плаћа се такса у противвредности 7 ДМ,

5. За тужбу због сметања поседа плаћа се такса

у износу у противвредности 4 ДМ.

6. За тужбу због исељења из стана и за отказ уговора о коришћењу стана плаћа се такса у изно-

су у противредности 7 ДМ.

7. За тужбу због отказа уговора о најму или закупу ствари за тужбу о отказу уговора о закупу пословних просторија плаћа се такса у износу у противвредности 7 ДМ.

8. За предлог да се дозволи извршење или обезбебење или изда привремена мера, за приговор против платног налога, за предлог за повраћај у превашње стање или за предлог за обезбевење доказа, за одговор на тужбу или ревизију, плаћа се половина таксе из тачке 1. овог тарифног броја.

9. За жалбу или ревизију против пресуде и за жалбу против решења у споровима эбог сметања поседа, плаћа се двострука такса из става 1. овог тарифног броја.


10. За жалбу или ревизију против решења, плаћа


се такса из става 1. овог тарифног броја.

напомена:

1. За тужбу у којој је стављен предлог за издавање платног налога плаћа се половина таксе из тачке 1. овог тарифног броја.

"It is not acceptable [to Serbs] for Bosnia to be an independent state . . . in which [Bosnian Serbs] would be divided from the whole of the Serb people or relegated to the status of a national minority." (R. Karadžić) "I do not understand some people around here . . . how can you like better someone from the other side of the Drina [the river that separates BiH from Serbia], who has a different mentality, who speaks differently?"





30000
25000
15000
10000
10000
5000
0
Bošnjaci Srbi Hrvati Ostali

Civili - 39684 33070 4075 2163 376


Vojnici - 57523 30966 20830 5625 102

Source: Istraživačko dokumentacioni centar; EUFOR-ALTHEA; Toal & Dahlman 2011, p. 289.










The social effects of war

- a) Ethnic separation, transformation of ethno-demographic landscape
 - Mono-ethnic territories, ethnic homogenization by violence and administrative means
- b) Ethnic boundary drawing, ethnic frames of loyalty and solidarity
 - War: "the biggest cultural event" (Ugo Vlaisavljević)
 - Ethnic division of people, space, time, language, politics and education; elimination of "mixed" life situations and categories; everyday ethnicity, relationship of "marked" and "unmarked"
- c) Ethno-territorial governance, combination of ethnic and territorial principle
 - Multinational federalism (international scrutiny): 2 entities, 10 cantons, Brčko district
 - Promotion of "minority return" (1999-2004)
 - Effective governance: sub-state administrative units with clear ethnic majority (RS entity, cantons and opštinas with Bosniak or Croat majority (vs. state-level, FBiH entity, Mostar municipality)
- d) Power concentration of ethnic parties
 - Control over territory, resources and jobs; hijacked privatization; politics-criminality nexus ("war-making and state-making as organized crime")
 - Fragmented, segmented, leader-oriented party system; informal government coalition (6-7 parties)
 - Strategic voting v. ideology ("nationalists"): patronage, ethnopolitical prisoner's dilemma

Administrative fragmentation of Bosnia-Herzegovina



Source: OSCE 2007, p. 36.

Constituent nations: competing ethnopolitics based on the similar majoritarian nation-state logic

\leftarrow	Bosniak:	Croat:	Serb: →	
STATE	unitary state	ethnic federalism (Croat entity?)	de facto state-building (territorial autonomy → secession?)	
NATION	civic & ethnic (titular nation?)	ethnic	ethnic	
MAJORI	FY state-level	cantonal level (sub-sub-state level)	entity level (sub-state level)	
DISCOURSE (source of legitimacy)				
	civic equality, ethno-cultural neutrality (e.g. France)	federalism (e.g. Belgium, Switzerland)	self-determination (e.g. Montenegro, Kosovo, Crimea, Scotland)	

	Nation concept	Ethnopolitical strategy
Bosniak	 Civic (and ethnic) nation concept Ethnic 'blindness', ethno-cultural neutrality (I man/I vote) Titular nation? Appropriation of BiH? Double standard: education = FBiH (integration) v. RS (segregation) 	 Unitary state, centralization; strengthen state-level competences (civic equality) Abolish RS entity, prevent RS entity veto (vote at prewar place of residence) Regionalization of BiH Mobilization of Bosniak refugess and diapora
Serb	 Ethnic nation concept Ethno-territorial autonomy Ethnic quota and representation, group-sensitive rules 2 'homelands'? Double standard: governance = RS (centralization) v. BiH (decentralization) 	-Territorial autonomy; secession? ('self-determination') - RS ethnic homogenization - Protection of entity-veto; strengthen RS competences (end of entity → state transfer) - RS centralization v. BiH decentralization - RS homogenization and quasi nation-state - Concentrate Bosnian Serbs within RS, deter non-Serb returnees
Croat	 Ethnic nation concept Ethno-territorial autonomy Ethnic quota and representation, group-sensitive rules 2 'homelands'? Double standard: administration of Mostar = Croat majority (unification) v. Bosniak majority (ethnic division) 	-Ethnic-based cantonization; own entity? ('federalism') - Strengthen cantons with Croat majority and their competences; participation in state-level decision-making (based on parity); weaken FBiH level with Bosniak majority - Preserve constituent people status - Ensure legitimate Croat representation - Mobilization of Croat refugees and diaspora



Republika Srpska (RS): ethno-territorial autonomy, de facto state-building

- Ethnic homogenization (54% \rightarrow >90%): violence, administrative means
- Entity-veto: I 4/5 RS representatives (HoR) can neutralize
 - Non-Serb refugee return; voting at pre-war place of residence; opposition coalition
- Entity → state competence-transfer's opposition
 - Min. of Agriculture (2,5m € IPA), Erasmus+ vs. Elektroprenos (50m KM)
- Budget (entity > state)
- Ethnic translation of social issues ('securitization', collective threat: RS/Serbs)
 - Corruption affairs; war crimes; 2014 protests; 'enemies of the RS' (SNSD)
- Focus on 'big issues' and symbolic questions
 - Threat of referendum on RS secession; constitutional reform; monuments
- Everyday ethnicity, memory of war(s)
- External sources of legitimacy
 - Serbia ('kin-state')
 - Russia (NATO, South Stream, investments)
 - Lobbying activities in the US and the EU (delegation in Bruxelles)
 - Use of international discourse on self-determination and practices based on SD claims: Montenegro, Kosovo, Crimea, Scotland

'Croat question': constituent nation status, legitimate representation, Croat entity/ethno-federalism

- Status degradation? Constituent nation → national minority?
 - 17% \rightarrow <10% (HR passport); mobilization during the 2013 census campaign
- Legitimate representation: 'ethnic' vs. 'political' Croat; Croat electoral list?
 - Exclusion of HDZ BiH from governing coalition (2000, 2010)
 - Croat member of BiH Presidency, Željko Komšić affair (2006, 2010)
- Croat entity (entity veto?)
 - Territorially non-contiguous, e.g. W-Herzegovina, C-Bosnia, Posavina (extra-territorial autonomy?)
- Ethnic translation of social issues ('securitization', collective threat: cantons/Croats)
 - Corruption affairs; war crimes; 2014 protests
- External sources of legitimacy: Croatia, diaspora, EU (MEPs), Catholic Church
 - Hijack Sejdić-Finci vs. BiH case → focus on 'Croat question' (hierarchy of pluralisms: I. Croats as constituent nation; 2. 'Others')
 - Language usage: human rights or ethnic differentiation?
 - Use of international discourse on federalism (vs. centralism or secessionism)

Constituent minorities: "ethnopolitical no man's land"

- a) "National minorities" (2003 minority law): c. 2%
- b) "Constituent minorities" (BiH Constitutional Court's decision, 2000): de facto minority position at local level; c. 10%

"Minority returnees": c. 470.000 (UNHCR 2011)

The social life of international and local categories

- Mirsad Tokaća: "I cannot be minority in my country, it's foolish!"; "We cannot speak about minority return, Bosniaks are majority returnees!" (Drina-valley)
- Prvi mart: 2012 Srebrenica; 2014 mobilize Bosniak diaspora ('long-distance nationalism')

Property restitution


- Aleksa Šantiča u. (Mostar): "Central Zone"; 29 Croat, 42 Bosniak, 23 Serb families
- Branimir Đokic v. BiH (ECHR 2010): JNA (military academy); Sarajevo Niš (Serbia);
 "disloyal" v. "honorable" citizen

Cuius regio, eius educatio

Konjevic Polje: both inter- and intra-ethnic conflict dimension ('controll-cooptation')


'Displaced/subtenants in our own town' (Mostar)






Source: Yarwood 1999, p. 113.

Disregard of school catchment areas (Ravno)



Source: OSCE 2007, p. 16.

Getting around catchment areas (Kiseljak)



Source: OSCE 2007, p. 24.



Thank you for your attention!

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